Brzezinski's Strategic Vision
“Balancing the East, Upgrading the
West”—that’s the most succinct summation of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s new
articulation of U.S. grand strategy, Strategic
Vision. In a wide-ranging 192
pages expounding on U.S. interests in the world’s most strategically relevant
nations, Brzezinski seeks to present a new blueprint for continued American
relevance in a world whose center of gravity is shifting toward the east.
Eastern Europe and Asia Minor are the fulcrum of this new center of world
power, and strengthening Western power here will provide us the leverage to
ensure that democracy, human rights, and rule of law remain vital to the
liberal international order. In this essay I’ll show why the Western
relationship with Russia and Turkey will perhaps be the defining arena for the
global politics in the next decade.
Brzezinski recalls the early 20th
century geopolitical strategist Halford Mackinder, who argued in a 1904 paper
before Britain’s Royal Geographic Society that Eurasia would constitute the crucial
“pivot area” of geostrategy, an emerging discipline of world politics as
defined by control of economic resources.
By 1919, Mackinder would summarize his theory thus:
"Who rules East Europe commands the
Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the
World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the
world."
Granted the father of modern geopolitics
could not have predicted the primacy of Middle East oil, the rise of China, and
the emergence of asymmetric warfare as key alternatives to his favored “pivot”
point in geostrategy, but it’s nonetheless difficult not to acknowledge his
prescience in emphasizing Eurasia which extends to even contemporary
policy-making.
Eastern Europe is crucial not only to Mackinder
in the early 20th century and Brzezinski today, but also in Napoleon’s
attempts to take Russia in the early 19th century. Also, in the
1930s and 1940s Mackinder’s theories influenced a generation of “organic state”
geo-strategists upon which were based Nazi expansionist efforts to move into
Eastern Europe and eventually take Russia. The emphasis on Eastern Europe also dominated
much of Cold War containment policy, and Brzezinski has devoted much of his
career to realizing Mackinder’s original vision that whoever controls Eastern
Europe can essentially make a claim on world hegemony. His 1950 Masters thesis
at McGill University focused on nationalities within the Soviet Union. As
President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Brzezinski highlighted the
importance of bolstering Soviet dissidents in Eastern Europe, many of them
leading nationalist movements. In 1988, Brzezinski correctly argued that the
Soviet Union would eventually fracture in Eastern Europe along lines of
nationality, directly recalling his original Masters thesis nearly forty years
before and his work as Carter’s National Security Advisor.
As Mackinder did, Brzezinski strongly
emphasized Eurasia in his more broad and well-known 1997 book The Grand Chessboard. With the more
programmatic Strategic Vision of
2012, Brzezinski gives country-by-country instructions for continued American
influence during the next 25 years. With little emphasis on South America,
Africa, or Australia, Strategic Vision focuses
in on Europe and Asia, but even Europe is mostly assumed away as part of the
West. The true focus, aside from how to repair America domestically, is almost
exclusively on Asia. This is naturally in step with much of current American
policy, as exemplified, for instance, in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s
recent essay in Foreign Policy, “America’s
Pacific Century:”
The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver
of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western
shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the
Indian -- that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts
almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the
global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home
to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India,
and Indonesia.
In order for our Asia policy to succeed,
however, we’ll need to focus much of our resources on “upgrading the West” in
order that we may “manage the East.” Brzezinski devotes many pages to how
America can repair itself domestically (by addressing issues like income
inequality, gridlocked politics, decaying infrastructure, and national debt),
but those can be addressed in another essay. Likewise, much weight can also be
put on partnering with China in a strategic dialogue and fostering pro-American
values of human rights, free and fair elections, and the rule of law there.
However, that too is a subject for another essay-length examination needed to
tease out the many complexities lying in store in Brzezinski’s thin, but dense volume.
The point I want to make here is that we
cannot ignore the degree to which we still live in Mackinder’s world, and that
in order for America’s example and values to have worldwide power, we must
focus on the region of the world that early scholar termed the “heartland.”
Eastern Europe has been essential to geostrategy for a century and much of it
(the Russian half, at least) remains fiercely independent, ambivalently
nostalgic for the grandeur of its Soviet past, reluctant to embrace rule of law
and free elections, and somewhat inclined toward a Russo-Sino alliance.
Cultivating Russia as a crucial member of the upgraded West is a vital piece of
American strategy. Likewise, Turkey is another key nation of the upgrading
West, and though it’s not technically part of Eastern Europe, it’s directly
adjacent to it. Turkey’s long history of secular modernization in a
predominantly Muslim nation makes it as important a member of the greater West
as ever before in light of the recent Arab Spring. It began secularization per
the European model in 1924 under its first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
and we should support efforts for Turkey to satisfy requirements to accede into
the European Union within the next decade.
Because Russia and Turkey are vital
members of the new West, I want to devote the remainder of the essay to showing
how they represent the crucial pivot point in America’s efforts to upgrade the
West, manage the East, and to remain the world’s foremost beacon of stability
and human prosperity. I’ll look first at Russia, examining the challenges and
obstacles for democracy before outlining a plan for American influence there
per Brzezinski’s prescription. I’ll then do the same for Turkey, first
highlighting the problems we face before showing how we can make the most of
the situation.
Russia presents a major long-term
strategic challenge over the next quarter-century. Its problems are many. First
Brzezinski notes, “Russia’s demographic crisis, political corruption, outdated
and resource-driven economic model, and social retardation” are among its
greatest issues. However even worse is the “persisting disregard…for the rule
of law” which is “perhaps its greatest impediment to a philosophical embrace
with the West” (Brzezinski 140). While the strongest inclination toward Europe
exists in the Russian business elite, the political elites have expressed more
of an inclination toward separation from America or to be an outright rival to
America. Other Russian elites eye the vast continental expanse of the nation’s Eurasian
breadth as a potential source of power (though the land is largely undeveloped
and barren). Still others want to see Russia project its power into a greater
“Slavic Union” that gives preferred treatment to the Ukraine and Belarus. And
most potent are those who dream of the past Soviet strength, those who don’t
question why “Lenin’s embalmed remains continue to be honored in a mausoleum
that overlooks the Red Square.” In short, the jury is still out on whether
Russia has any desire to even be a part of the West.
Though
there is much reason to fret, we can also be encouraged by the surprising, if
short-lived, presidency of Dmitri Medvedev. Brzezinski’s book was released in
January, shortly before Putin unsurprisingly won the presidential elections. Therefore Strategic Vision at least held out the
possibility that Putin might not regain his authoritarian and anti-Western hold
on the country. Yet although Medvedev had been hand-picked for the presidency
by Putin, Medvedev had surprised many with his outspoken advocacy for democracy
and human rights. His online statements at the official Web portal for the
President of Russia impressed Brzezinski so much that the author singled them
out for spotlighting in a rare offset text box in the book:
Democracy needs to be protected. The
fundamental rights and freedoms of our citizens must be as well. They need to
be protected from the sort of corruption the breeds tyranny, lack of freedom,
and injustice…Nostalgia should not guide our foreign policy and our strategic
long-term goal is Russia’s modernization. [One can only wonder whom Medvedev
had in mind when making his pointed reference to “nostalgia in foreign policy.]
The fact that such sentiments can exist at the top level of Russian government
proves that democratic dreams have strong presence in modern post-Soviet Russia
even though at present internal chaos breeds the popular notion that Putin’s
strongman tactics are necessary for now to hold the nation together. Yet the
necessity for short-term authoritarianism does not mean Putinism is a reliable
long-term project. Indeed Brzezinski points out major flaws in each of the alternative
long-term visions for Russia’s strategic interests that I outlined above. Each approach
that does not advocate unity with the West is either unrealistic and
unsustainable. Brezisnki argues, as Medvedev does, that Russia’s “only real
option” for future prosperity is a future partnership with Europe, Asia, and
yes, America.
Though the obstacles for near-term philosophical affinity with Russia
appear bleak, Brzezinski offers an important ray of hope, “it is useful to bear
in mind the dramatic transformation of global geopolitical realities that has
occurred in just the last forty years and the fact that we live in a time
characterized by the dramatic acceleration of history.” As new technologies
help spur new revolutions in information availability and consequently in
political consciousness (with examples from the Gutenberg printing press all
the way to the al-Jazeera and the Arab Spring), the progress of strengthening
democratic values in Russia might occur far quicker than we might think.
While
Russia is at best ambivalent about joining the West, there is no question that
Turkey has already long harbored aspirations of Europeanization. A more
European Turkey is as much in the Turkish interest as it is the Western
interest. “It is a geopolitical reality,” Brzezinski writes, “that a genuinely
Western-type Turkish democracy, if solidly anchored in the West through more
than just NATO, could be Europe’s shield protecting it from the restless Middle
East” (Brzezinski 128). We can also assume that the demonstration effect of
Turkey’s secularization and democratization could influence political
consciousness in Tunisia, Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world in a more
pro-Western direction. Bolstering Turkey as a regional power and a reliable
counterweight to Iranian theocracy is a long-term strategic interest.
While there is a risk of Turkey
backsliding toward Islamic theocracy, the nation’s long traditions of modern
secular democracy and its affinity for the West make courting it far easier
than Russia. The challenges in the Turkish case are much fewer: “some
persisting retardation in some social aspects including press freedom,
education, and human development” (Brzezinski 137). The most pressing challenge Brzezinski highlights is
Turkey’s continued exclusion from Europe per European anti-immigrant and
anti-Muslim sentiment as well as EU fears of embracing a poorer country
particularly while in the grips of the debt crisis. Add to this the fact that
18 of the 35 chapters of negotiation on Turkey’s accommodation to EU law are
currently frozen by France, the EU, or Cyprus, and we see major impediments to
bringing Turkey into the fold. If we perpetuate this exclusion, we could be
grappling with an increasingly bitter and anti-Western class of poorly educated
people for whom Islam will gain credence.
Although Brzezinski’s Strategic Vision is light on programmatic
details for how we can include Turkey in the wider West, the recipe is widely
available elsewhere. While Turkey has largely expressed an historical desire to
become more European and is already a NATO member, the progress of talks to
help it gain access to the EU has been stalled for the last several years. By
contrast, while Brzezinski could only outline the alignment of interests that
might occur for Russia to simply want to
one day join NATO or the EU, the biggest issue right now for Turkey is how to
progress through the messy negotiation process to actually join the EU. Our embrace with Turkey now only faces practical
issues, while with Russia it is still in philosophical doubt. By 2013 it is
highly unlikely Turkey will satisfy all 35 areas of EU law that it needs to
satisfy for the next round of evaluations. However, 2021 is more realistic
target to work through the current stalemate.
Though most commentators and strategists
will continue to emphasize China as the most intimidating power rising today,
we are wise to remember that China’s rise is not as sure as some make it out to
be. The Chinese experience is fraught with many problems, particularly the
rising political consciousness in its new middle class and its problem
squelching dissidents in the information age. While China is being forced to
sort out its internal problems, no one doubts the need for a long-term
strategic dialogue between our two countries. But perhaps even more crucial in increasing
the American stake in the new global power balance is to focus on Turkey and
Russia. Strengthening Western democratic values in these nations will actually
directly strengthen democratic values in China. We’ll be wise to remember the
world that Mackinder saw more than a century ago.
But even further back than Mackinder’s observations are Brzezinski’s exhortations about the Byzantine experience following the fall of Rome in 476. One of his prevailing themes is that, while Byzantine could insulate itself geographically and politically from the failing Roman Empire, such lucky diplomatic finesse is impossible in the globally interconnected world of 2012. Brzezinski uses this motif as synecdoche for his overall vision of the book that America must carefully manage its relations throughout all of Eurasia because it is impossible to remain a world power in an isolationist context. But the Byzantine example is especially powerful and it’s worth taking the metaphor a couple steps further. Accepting Brzezinski’s point of global interdependence, Byzantium can be a brighter bellwether of modern geostrategy. Whereas 1,500 years ago it was a model of isolation, today the descendents of Byzantium which make up Turkey and parts of Russia could be the perfect symbol for the global appeal of democratic values in the 21st century.